yet we have already presumed them to be uniform in species [muttafiqatan fi al-naw'], possessing neither variation, multiplicity, nor distinct separation.

And [to claim] that multiplicity arises from its relation to elements and matter—which are themselves multiplied across space and time—is likewise impossible. For if we presume the soul to exist prior to the body as a abstract quiddity [mahiyyah mujarradah], it would possess no specific relation to one piece of matter over another. Insofar as it is a pure quiddity, there is no variation within it. Verily, things whose essences consist of intelligible concepts [ma'ani] experience multiplicity within their specific types only by virtue of accidental states, capacities [al-qawabil], and the passive effects wrought upon them [al-munfa'ilat 'anha]; hence, if they are entirely abstract, it is impossible for alteration or numerical multiplicity to exist among them.

And by my life, it [the soul] endures after the body as a pluralistic multiplicity. For every single one of these souls has come to exist as a distinct, individuated essence by virtue of the variation in their prior material substrates, the variation in the timings of their origination,